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I. Introduction
In 2008, the field of international trade experienced considerable activity in some areas
and virtual stagnation in others. The World Trade Organization (WTO) welcomed two
new members in 2008: Ukraine and Cape Verde. Progress on Russia's accession suffered a
setback in 2008 due to the Russian-Georgian War in South Ossetia and Abkhazia and
other bilateral issues. Additionally, the expiration of Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) in
2007 and the U.S. presidential and congressional elections created uncertainty as to
whether the next administration would honor U.S.-negotiated agreements and whether
the new Congress would approve them. Thus, despite optimism that a conclusion to the
Doha Development Round was possible in 2008, world financial problems and continued
disagreement on key issues between developed and developing countries forestalled a
global trade deal this year. Negotiations on agriculture and non-agricultural market ac-
cess (NAMA) modalities also collapsed at the Ministerial meeting in July 2008.
Fourteen new WTO disputes were initiated in 2008, compared to thirteen disputes in
2007. In terms of WTO dispute settlement decision making, thirteen Panel Reports and
eight Appellate Body Reports were issued, representing a significant increase compared to
2007. The most significant decision issued by the Appellate Body in 2008 was in US!
Canada-Continued Suspension of Obligations in EC-Hormones, as it marked the first time
the Appellate Body addressed "post-retaliation" situations, which are not covered by cur-
rent WTO disciplines. The Panels and Appellate Body also continued to express diver-
gent views on the issue of zeroing in 2008. In NAFTA dispute settlement, the binational
panel in Carbon & Alloy Steel Wire Rod from Canada declared itself a "generic or virtual
United States court" but then followed decisions of the WTO Appellate Body regarding
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the legality of the Department of Commerce (DOC) practice of "zeroing" in antidumping
cases.
Domestically, the rate of initiation of antidumping and countervailing duty investiga-
tions during 2008 decreased from 2007 levels. Notable developments in domestic trade
remedies practice included the development of a new "targeted dumping" test by DOC
and increasing focus on China. In United States v. Eurodif, S.A., the U.S. Supreme Court,
for the first time in history of the trade law, entertained briefs and oral argument regard-
ing an antidumping duty appeal. The issue was whether the DOC correctly ruled that it
could apply the antidumping duty law to companies in the business of uranium enrich-
ment. At the time of writing, the Court had yet to issue its decision.
Finally, developing countries were the big winners in this year's small flurry of legisla-
tive activity. Trade preference programs benefiting over 130 developing countries were
extended and modified just as they were about to expire. But the movement on trade
preference programs stands in stark contrast to the lack of progress on three pending free
trade agreements and other trade-related legislation.
II. Negotiation Developments
Little progress was made in trade negotiations in 2008, in part due to the expiration of




Despite optimism at the beginning of the year that a conclusion to the Doha Develop-
ment Round was possible in 2008, world financial problems and continued disagreement
on key issues between developed and developing countries forestalled a global trade deal
this year. Negotiations on agriculture and non-agricultural market access (NAMA) mo-
dalities collapsed at the Ministerial meeting in July 2008. At the time of writing, political
support and a pledge from world leaders to conclude modalities negotiations failed to
revive talks.
In the agricultural negotiations, the major stumbling block was the inability of the
United States and India to agree on a special safeguard mechanism for farmers in develop-
ing countries, in particular the tariff trigger for safeguards.I Other unresolved agricultural
issues include farm tariff simplification, treatment of sensitive products, the creation of
new tariff-rate quotas in developed countries, and cotton subsidies.2 In the NAMA nego-
tiations, there was some convergence on tariff-cutting for specified sectors of trade, but
WTO Members could not bridge disagreements over coefficients on the tariff-cutting
formula and the range of flexibilities for developing countries.
3
1. See Daniel Pruzin & Eric J. Lyman, Doha Talks Collapse Over U.S.-India Dispute On Ag Safeguards;
Future of Round in Doubt, INT'L TRADE DAILY (BNA), July 30, 2008; The United States and India, WASH.
TRADE DAILY, July 31, 2008,
2. No Flexibility Yet in Agriculture, WAH. TRADE DAILY, Nov. 18, 2008 [hereinafter No Flexibility].
3. See Some NAMA Successes, WAS. TRADE DAILY, July 30, 2008.
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During the G-20 Summit in November, leaders called for agreement on modalities by
the end of 2008. 4 While agreement by the end of the year seemed theoretically possible,
the lack of substantial political will and movement away from entrenched positions killed
any hope for agreement. Talks continued in Geneva with the goal of having a ministerial
meeting in December 2008. 5 A ministerial never came to fruition due in part to minimal
movement in countries' positions.
2. Accession Negotiations
The WTO welcomed two new members in 2008. Ukraine became the 152nd member
of the WTO on May 16, 2008,6 and Cape Verde became the 153rd member on July 23,
2008. 7 Ukraine's Rada (the country's parliament), however, has been slow to pass all the
legislation necessary to comply with its WTO obligations, including amendments to its
food safety laws and a bill to lower its customs tariffs.8 Vhilc Equatorial Guinea was the
only country to start the accession process this year,9 several of the twenty-eight other
countries with pending applications continued to make progress towards accession in
2008.10
Progress on Russia's accession suffered a setback in 2008 due to the Russian-Georgian
War in South Ossetia and Abkhazia and other bilateral issues. In the first half of the year,
the United States was pushing for Russian accession by the end of 2008.11 But U.S. sup-
port faltered after the crisis in Georgia, with U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice
stating in September 2008 that Russia's WTO accession was "going nowhere."12 Other
roadblocks to Russia's WTO membership bid arose in 2008, including continued U.S.
concern over Russian intellectual property protection 13 and E.U. opposition to Russian
export duties on timber.' 4 Despite these obstacles, the Russian government remains com-
4. Declaration, Leaders of the Group of Twenty, Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy
(Nov. 15, 2008), available at http://www.g20.org/Documents/g20._summit-declaration.pdf.
5. Doha Talks Begin Year-End Push After Strong G20 Political Statement, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Nov. 17, 2008.
6. See Press Release, World Trade Organization [WTO], Ukraine Becomes the WTO's 152nd Member
(May 16, 2008), available at http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/news08-e/acc-urkmay08-e.htm.
7. See Press Release, W.TO, Cape Verde Becomes the WTO's 153rd Member (July 23, 2008), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/newse/news08-e/acc-capverde-julyO8-e.htm.
8. See Sergei Blagov, Ukraine Struggles to Adopt Legislation Related to the WTO, INT'L TRADE DAILY
(BNA), Oct. 16, 2008.
9. See Press Release, WTO, General Council Establishes Working Party for Equatorial Guinea (Feb. 5,
2008), available at http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/news08-e/acc-equatorial-guinea-feb08_e.htm.
10. See Summary Table of Ongoing Accessions, www.wto.org/english/thewto e/acc_e/status_e.htm (last
visited Apr. 1, 2009).
11. See U.S. Presses Russian Accession to WTO After Bush-Putin Pledge, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Apr. 11, 2008.
12. Gary G. Yerkey, Russia's Bid to Join WTO 'Going Nowhere,' Rice Says, Citing Fallout From Georgia Crisis,
INT'L TRADE DAILY (BNA), Sept. 25, 2008.
13. See OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2008 SPECIAL 301 REPORT 34 (Apr. 25, 2008), available
at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document-_Library/Reports-Pubhications/2008/2008-Special-301-Report/as-
set upload-file553_14869.pdf. Russia was kept on the Priority Watch List due to weak enforcement against
piracy and counterfeiting in Russia, particularly with respect to production of infringing optical media and
Internet piracy. See also Press Release, Office of U.S. Trade Representative, USTR Issues Special 301 Report
(Apr. 25, 2008), available at http://www.ustr.gov/Document-Library/Press-Releases/2008/April/USTRIs-
sues_2008_Special_30lReport.htnl.
14. See Daniel Pruzin, EU Starts Campaign to End Export Curbs on Raw Materials, May Initiate WTO Case,
INT'L TRADE DAILY (BNA), Sept. 30, 2008.
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mitted to joining the WTO,15 and Prime Minister Putin appointed a commission to su-
pervise and manage the WTO accession process. 16
B. BILATERAL/REGIoNAL NEGOTIATIONS
1. Status of Bilateral Trade Agreements
United States' bilateral trade negotiations were largely stalled in 2008. Negotiations of
the U.S.-Malaysia free trade agreement (FTA) quietly resumed this year 17 but did not
make any discernible progress. The Malaysian government has indicated its hope for ne-
gotiating more favorable terms with the incoming Obama administration.' 8 Although ne-
gotiations between the United States and the Southern Africa Customs Union (SACU)
remain suspended, the United States signed a Trade, Investment and Development Coop-
eration Agreement with SACU in July 2008, which will act as a "formal mechanism" for
concluding interim trade-related agreements that could lead to a FTA in the future.19
The U.S.-Thailand and U.S.-United Arab Emirates FTA talks remained dormant this
year.
The United States and China began negotiating a bilateral investment treaty (BIT) in
2008. The launch of the BIT was announced at the June 2008 meeting of the U.S.-China
Strategic Economic Dialogue. 20 U.S. and Chinese negotiators held several rounds of talks
in the fall of 2008. Initially, progress was slow, however, with the meetings reportedly
focused more on a review of U.S. BIT model text and less on substantive negotiations. 21
But headway is expected in 2009 as the Chinese tabled their own proposed draft for the
BIT during November 2008 negotiations.22
2. Anti- Counterfeiting Trade Agreement
Negotiations on the multilateral Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) began
in June 2008 and several rounds of discussion were held through the end of the year.
Other participants in the negotiations include Australia, Canada, the European Union,
Japan, Jordan, Korea, Mexico, Morocco, New Zealand, Singapore, Switzerland, and the
15. See Sergei Blagov, Russia's Putin Pledges to Pursue Accession to WTO, as Cabinet Adopts Trade Blueprint,
INT'L TRADE DAILY (BNA), Oct. 28, 2008.
16. See Sergei Blagov, Russian Government Forms Commission To Oversee Country's TO Entry Efforts, INT'L
TRADE DAILY (BNA), Oct. 31, 2008.
17. See Amy Tsui, President Bush to Visit Thailand During Trip to Asia, as Well as China, Korea, INT'L TRADE
DAILY (BNA), July 7, 2008.
18. See Around the Globe, WASHINGTON TRADE DAILY, Nov. 19, 2008.
19. Press Release, Office of U.S. Trade Representative, Ambassador Schwab Signs Historic Trade Agree-
ment with Countries of the Southern African Customs Union (July 16, 2008), available at http://
www.ustr.gov/assets/Document -Library/PressReleases/2008/July/asset-upload-file628-l 501 9.pdf.
20. OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, UNITED STATES LAUNCHES NEGOTIATIONS OF AN IN-
VESTMEN'T TREATY WITH CHINA (June 2008), available at http://www.ustr.gov/assetslDocument-Library/
FactSheets/2008/asset-upload file993-14943.pdf.
21. China Update, CInNESE TRADE EXTRA (Inside Washington), Nov. 14, 2008.
22. Senior U.S., Chinese Officials Signal Progress on Investment Pact, CHINESE TRADE ExTRA (INSIDE
WASHINGTON), Dec. 4, 2008
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United Arab Emirates, 23 though not every country attended each round. 24 Specific details
on the negotiations were not publicized. 25 Several public interest groups sued in Septem-
ber 2008 under the Freedom of Information Act to obtain a copy of the draft treaty text.2 6
At a public meeting on ACTA also in September, the lead U.S. negotiator stated that
there was no "specific draft text" to disclose and that negotiations were largely guided by
already-concluded U.S.-FTA negotiations, particularly the U.S.-South Korea FTA.27 The
U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) believed that ACTA could come into force into 2009
if the next administration continues to move forward with negotiations. 28
3. Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership
The United States announced in September 2008 that it would enter negotiations to
join the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership, known as the P-429 The P-4 is a
free trade agreement among Brunei Darussalam, Chile, Singapore, and New Zealand.
The United States participated in three rounds of negotiations on the financial services
and investment chapters before deciding to initiate efforts to join the P-4 as a full party.30
Australia, Peru, and Vietnam have also expressed interest in joining the P-4.31 The next
round of negotiations was scheduled for March 2009 but were postponed while the
Obama administration assessed its trade policy priorities and installed its trade
leadership.3 2
Ill. WTO and NAFTA Dispute Settlement Activity
The number of new disputes brought before the WTO in 2008 was commensurate with
the number of cases initiated in previous years. Fourteen new disputes were initiated in
23. See OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, TRADE FACTS: ANTI-COUNTERFEITING TRADE
AGREEMENT (ACTA) (Aug. 4, 2008).
24. Jordan and the United Arab Emirates did not participate in the discussions held in October 2008. See
Amy Tsui, ACTA Negotiating Members Met in Japan Oct. 8-9 With Focus on Criminal Penalties, INT'L TRADE
DAILY (BNA), Oct. 14, 2008.
25. See Carey Lening, Citizens' Groups, Others Sue USTR Seeking Public Disclosure of Counterfeiting Treaty,
IN T'L TRADE DAILY (BNA), Sept. 22, 2008.
26. Id.
27. See Carey Lening & Anandashankar Mazumdar, USTR Official Cites Confidentiality 'Understandings' in
ACTA Negotiations, INT'L TRADE DAILY (BNA), Sept. 23, 2008.
28. See Rossella Brevetti, U.S.-Oman Trade Pact Expected to Enter Into Force After Long Delay, Veroneau Says,
INT'L TRADE DAILY (BNA), Nov. 17, 2008.
29. Press Release, United States Trade Representative, Trans-Pacific Partners and United States Launch
FTA Negotiations (Sept. 22, 2008), available at http://www.ustr.gov/Document-Library/Press -Releases/
2008/September/Schwab Statement_on_launch_of theUSNegotiationstojoin theTrans-PacificStra-
tegicEconomicPartnershipAgreement.html.
30. OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, TRADE FACTS: UNITED STIAT.s TO NEGOTIATE PARTICI-
PATION IN TRANS-PACiFIC STRATEGIC ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIF (Sept. 2008), available at hnp://
www.ustr.gov/assets/World-Regions/Southeast-_AsiaPacificfTrans-Pacific-Parmership-Agreement/Fact_
Sheets/asset-upload-file602_l5133.pdf; see also USTR, Ambassadors Hopeful Obama Will Back Transpacific FTA,
INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Nov. 4, 2008 [hereinafter Ambassadors Hopefid].
31. Ambassadors Hopeful, supra note 30.
32. Delaying a TPP Meeting, WSSH. TRADE DAILY, Mar. 5, 2009.
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2008, compared to thirteen disputes in 2007. 33 Complaints initiated in 2008 addressed
claims under a wide variety of agreements, including the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GAT), the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), the Agreement
on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement), the Agreement on Imple-
mentation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (AD Agreement),
and the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT).
In WTO dispute settlement decision making, 2008 was a very busy year. In total, thir-
teen Panel Reports and eight Appellate Body Reports (in ten appeals) 34 were issued, which
represented a significant increase in comparison to the eight Panel Reports and five Ap-
pellate Body Reports that were issued in 2007.3 5
A. PANEL AND APPELLATE BODY REPORTS
1. US/Canada-Continued Suspension of Obligations in EC-Hormones
The most significant decision issued by the Appellate Body in 2008 was in US/Canada-
Continued Suspension of Obligations in EC-Hormones.36 In that dispute, the Appellate Body
addressed claims by the European Communities (EC) that the United States and Canada
had violated Articles 22.8 and 23 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Gov-
erning the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) by failing to remove their retaliatory measures
vis-a-vis the EC following the adoption of a measure that allegedly achieved compliance
with the Dispute Settlement Body's (DSB's) recommendations and rulings in EC-Hor-
mones.37 This was the first time the Appellate Body addressed "post-retaliation" situa-
tions, which are not covered by current WTO disciplines. Also significant were the
Appellate Body's findings concerning the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement (SPS
Agreement), in particular Articles 5.1 and 5.7 thereof.
The United States and Canada successfully appealed the Panel's findings that they com-
mitted "procedural violations" under Article 23 of the DSU by maintaining their retalia-
tory measures against the EC following the adoption of a measure that allegedly
implemented the decision in EC-Hormones. In a ruling that significantly reinforces the
effectiveness of trade sanctions as an enforcement mechanism under VVTO rules, the Ap-
pellate Body clarified that, under Article 22.8 of the DSU, the application of retaliatory
measures may continue until substantive compliance with the covered agreements is achieved
33. See WTO, Chronological List of Disputes Cases, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu-e/
dispu-statuse.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2009).
34. The Appellate Body decided to issue a single, consolidated report in the appeals in US-Shrimp (Thai-
land) and US-Customs Bond Directive; and in EC-Bananas HI (Article 21.5-Ecuador II), and EC-Bananas III
(Article 21.5-US). See supra notes 24 and 29.
35. See WorldTradeLaw.net, V/TO Dispute Settlement Reports, http://www.worldtradelaw.netI (last vis-
ited Apr. 1, 2009).
36. See Appellate Body Report, US-Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC-Hormones Dispute, VTI
DS320/AB/R (Oct. 16, 2008); Appellate Body Report, Canada-Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC-
Hormones Dispute, WT/DS32l/ABR/R, (Oct. 16, 2008).
37. See Appellate Body Report, EC-Hormones, VT/DS26/AB/R and WT/DS48/AB/R Gan. 16, 1998).
The Appellate Body found that the EC's import ban on hormone-treated beef was not "based on" a risk
assessment, as required by Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement because scientific studies in support of the
measure were not sufficiently specific to the particular risks at issue.
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by the implementing Member. 38 Until substantive compliance is achieved, or confirmed
in VTO adjudication, the authorization granted by the DSB to suspend concessions does
not lapse. 39 For this reason, the Appellate Body concluded that the U.S. and Canada were
neither "seeking the redress of a violation," nor making a "determination to the effect that
a violation has occurred" within the meaning of Articles 23.1 and 23.2(a) of the DSU by
continuing to retaliate against the EC.4°
Furthermore, the Appellate Body established that a compliance proceeding under Arti-
cle 21.5 of the DSU is the "proper course of action within the procedural structure of the
DSU"41 in situations where there is disagreement as to whether substantive compliance
has been achieved by measures taken after imposition of retaliatory measures. In so find-
ing, the Appellate Body rejected the EC's argument that the implementing Member (the
respondent in the original case) could not "self-initiate" proceedings under Article 21.5 of
the DSU. The Appellate Body held that either the retaliating Member or the implement-
ing Member could initiate Article 21.5 proceedings, because "both the suspending Mem-
ber and the implementing Member share the responsibility to ensure that the suspension
of concessions is not applied indefinitely." 42 The Appellate Body explained that the bur-
den of proof for the original respondent in a "self-initiated" Article 2 1.5 proceeding would
be
a clear description of its implementing measure, and an adequate explanation regard-
ing how this measure rectifies the inconsistencies found in the original proceedings,
so as to place the Article 2 1.5 panel in a position to make an objective assessment of
the matter and, in the absence of rebuttal, to rule in favour of the original
respondent. 43
For all other issues before the Article 21.5 Panel, including claims that the implement-
ing measure violates provisions otherwise not covered by the DSB's recommendations
rulings, the burden of proof would rest with the original complainant.44
In the same dispute, the EC was successful in reversing the Panel's findings that its
import ban on hormone-treated beef was not consistent with Articles 5.1 and 5.7 of the
SPS Agreement. Preliminarily, the Appellate Body found that the Panel infringed the
EC's due process rights by appointing and consulting as experts two scientists who had
been directly involved in the risk assessments underlying the international standards from
which the EC's measure deviated. 45 In addition, the Appellate Body found that the Panel
erred by conducting a de novo review of the EC's risk assessment when the standard of
review applicable under Article 5.1 required the Panel to simply identify the scientific
evidence that served as a basis for the EC's risk assessment; verify that such evidence
38. See Appellate Body Report, Canada-Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC-Hornones Dispute,
supra note 36, at 306.
39. See id. 1 310.
40. Id. T 292.
41. See id. 91 345.
42. See id. 91348.
43. See id. 91 362.
44. See id. 9 364.
45. See id. 91481.
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comes from respected and qualified sources; and determine whether the reasoning articu-
lated on the basis of the scientific evidence is objective and coherent.46
Finally, the Appellate Body reversed the "critical mass" standard developed by the Panel
to examine whether the relevant scientific evidence on five of the hormones at issue was
"insufficient" within the meaning of Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement. The Appellate
Body explained that the existence of international standards for those hormones "has pro-
bative value, but is not dispositive," of the question of whether the relevant scientific evi-
dence is insufficient, particularly where a Member adopts an SPS measure that does not
conform to those international standards. 47 Thus, rather than requiring a paradigm shift
in the scientific knowledge, it is sufficient that new scientific evidence "casts doubts as to
whether the previously existing body of scientific evidence still permits of a sufficiently
objective assessment of risk."48 Despite these findings, the Appellate Body concluded that
it could not complete the legal analysis and determine whether the EC's import ban on
hormone-treated beef was justified under Articles 5.1 and 5.7 of the SPS Agreement. This
question shall be addressed in the Article 21.5 DSU panel that the Appellate Body recom-
mended that the United States, Canada, and the EC initiate. 49 By virtue of the Appellate
Body's decision, however, the United States and Canada may continue to apply sanctions
against the EC pending the final outcome of those proceedings.
2. China-Auto Parts
On December 15, 2008, the Appellate Body issued its first ruling against China since its
accession to the WTO in 2001. In China-Auto Parts, Canada, the EC and the U.S.
successfully challenged a twenty-five percent charge imposed by China on auto parts that
are subsequently assembled into complete motor vehicles.50 The Appellate Body largely
rejected China's appeal and upheld the Panel's findings the Chinese measure violated Ar-
ticles 111:2 and 111:4 of the GATT, because it discriminated against imported over domes-
tic like auto parts.51 In so finding, the Appellate Body upheld the Panel's important
threshold finding that the Chinese measure should be characterized as an "internal
charge" under Article 111:2, rather than a border measure under Article I.l(b) of the
GAIT. The Appellate Body reasoned that this was the case because the obligation to pay
the charge accrued internally, after the auto parts have been assembled into complete
vehicles. 52
But China successfully challenged the Panel's finding that the tariff treatment of com-
pletely knocked-down (CKD) or semi-knocked down (SKD) kits53 violated China's com-
mitment under paragraph 93 of its Accession Working Party Report not to apply a tariff
46. See id. 602.
47. See id. 191 697, 711.
48. See id. 9 703.
49. See id. 9 737.
50. Appellate Body Report, China-Measures Affecting Imports ofAutomobile Parts, WT/ DS3 39/AB/R, WAT/
DS340/AB/R, and WT/DS342/AB/R, (Dec. 15, 2008).
51. See id., para. 186 and 197.
52. See id., paras. 161-62.
53. CKD and SKD kits are all or nearly all of the parts and components necessary to assemble a complete
motor vehicle, which must be packaged and shipped in a single shipment, and which must go through the
assembly process in the importing country to become a complete vehicle. See id., para. 210.
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greater than ten percent if China created tariff lines for CKD and SKD kits. The Appel-
late Body found that the Panel erred in characterizing the twenty-five percent charge
applicable on imports of CKD and SKI) kits as an "internal charge", and therefore re-
versed this finding.54
3. US-Stainless Steel and US-Continued Existence of Zeroing
In 2008, Panels and the Appellate Body continued to take different views on the ques-
tion of whether WTO disciplines permit the practice of zeroing. In US-Stainless Steel,
the Appellate Body reversed the Panel and found that the use of zeroing in periodic re-
views is inconsistent with Article 9.3 of the AD Agreement and Article VI:2 of GATT,
both "as such" and "as applied."55 Following the analytical approach developed in US-
Zeroing (EC)56 and US-Zeroing (yapan),57 the Appellate Body reiterated its interpretation
that the concepts of "dumping" and "margins of dumping" in Article VI of GAITF are
defined in relation to a "product" and address the pricing practice of exporters. 5s For this
reason, dumping cannot be found to occur at the transaction or importer-specific level.5 9
The Appellate Body also considered that zeroing in periodic reviews is inconsistent with
Article 9.3 of the AD Agreement because it results in the levy of duties that exceed the
exporter's or foreign producer's dumping margin.60
Also in US-Stainless Steel, the Appellate Body made important findings concerning
precedents in WTO dispute settlement. In its appeal, Mexico claimed that the Panel's
decision to depart from well-established Appellate Body jurisprudence on zeroing violated
Article 11 of the DSU, which regulates panels and establishes the standard of review.
Although the Appellate Body confirmed its interpretation that reports are not binding
except with respect to the parties to a particular dispute, it held that subsequent panels are
not free to disregard legal interpretations and the ratio decidendi contained in previous
Appellate Body reports.61 Controversially, the Appellate Body added that the requirement
to provide "security and predictability" to the multilateral trading system under Article 3.2
of the DSU implies that "absent cogent reasons, an adjudicatory body will resolve the
same legal question in the same way in a subsequent case." 62 The Appellate Body, never-
theless, refrained from finding a violation of Article 11 of the DSU because in its estima-
tion the Panel's error flowed from its "misguided understanding" of the legal provisions at
issue.63
The Appellate Body's ruling on the value of precedent in US-Stainless Steel had imme-
diate effects on subsequent panels that addressed the question of zeroing. On October 1,
54. See id., paras. 244-45.
55. See Appellate Body Report, US-Final Anti-Dumping Measures on Stainless Steel from Mexico, V/!
DS344/AB/R (Apr. 30, 2008) [hereinafter US-Stainless Steel.
56. See Appellate Body Report, US-Laws, Regulations and Methodology for Calculating Dumping Margins
("Zeroing"), WT/DS294/AB/R (Apr. 18, 2006).
57. See Appellate Body Report, US-Measures Relating to Zeroing and Sunset Reviews, WT/DS322/AB/R
(Jan. 9, 2007).
58. See US-Stainless Steel, supra note 55, at H 86, 94.
59. See id. It 98, 99.
60. See id. 1 102.
61. See id. 1 158.
62. See id. 1 160.
63. See id. 1 162.
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2008, the Panel in US-Continued Existence of Zeroing decided for the first time to follow
the Appellate Body's case law on this issue and found, despite having numerous objections
to the reasoning developed by the Appellate Body, that the application of zeroing in peri-
odic reviews is inconsistent with Article VI:2 of the GATT and 9.3 of the AD Agree-
ment. 64 The Panel also ruled against the use of zeroing in original investigations and in
sunset reviews.
4. India-Additional Duties
On October 30, 2008, the Appellate Body issued its report in India-Additional Duties.
65
This dispute concerned claims by the United States that the additional and "extra-addi-
tional" duties imposed by India on imports of alcoholic beverages and other products
resulted in the imposition of "ordinary customs duties" or "other duties or charges" that
exceeded the bound rates set out in India's Schedule of Concessions, in violation of Article
11:1(a) and (b) of GATT. In response, India claimed that the additional and extra-addi-
tional duties were justified under Article II:2(a) of GAT, which permits Members to
impose charges on imports in excess of bound rates provided that such charges are
"equivalent" to internal taxes imposed on domestic goods consistent with Article I1:2 of
GATT, and as such were not covered by Article 11:1(b).
On appeal, the United States successfully challenged the Panel's finding that the United
States had failed to establish a prima facie case that the additional and extra-additional
duties were inconsistent with Article 11:1 (a) and (b) of GATT. The Appellate Body re-
versed the Panel's finding that Article 1: 1 (b) of GATT covers only duties and charges that
"inherently discriminate against imports." 66 The Appellate Body found instead that the
second sentence of Article H: 1 (b) covers "all duties or charges of any kind imposed on or in
connection with importation other than [ordinary customs duties], including those duties
or charges that do not inherently discriminate against imports.
'67
The Appellate Body also reversed the Panel's conclusion that the term "equivalent" in
Article 1:2(a) of GATT does not require a quantitative comparison between the border
charge and the internal tax imposed on domestic goods. The Appellate Body found that
the determination of whether a border charge is equivalent to an internal tax imposed on
domestic goods "must also include quantitative considerations relating to their effect and
amount."68 This ruling confirms that, in order to be justified under Article II:2(a), a bor-
der charge must not exceed the internal tax it is designed to offset.
Even though the Appellate Body did not complete the legal analysis, it considered that
the additional and extra-additional duties would not be justified under Article II:2(a) of
GATT insofar as they would result in charges on imports that exceed internal taxes on
domestic products and consequently would violate Article 1:1(b) of GATT to the extent
that they would result in the imposition of duties in excess of those set forth in India's
64. See Panel Report, US-Continued Existence and Application of Zeroing Methodology, WT/DS350/R (Oct. 1,
2008).
65. See Appellate Body Report, India-Additional and Extra-Additional Duties on Imports from the United
States, WT/DS360/AB/R (Oct. 30, 2008).
66. Id. 1158.
67. See id. (emphasis in original).
68. See id. T 175.
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Schedule of Concessions. 69 During the course of the proceedings, India ceased to apply
the additional and extra-additional duties on imported products, subject to certain
conditions.
5. Other Disputes
The Appellate Body and Panels issued three additional decisions in 2008. On July 16,
2008, the Appellate Body issued its report for the appeals in US-Shrimp (Thailand) and
US-Customs Bond Directive.70 The Appellate Body upheld the Panels' finding that the Ad
Note to Article VI:2 and 3 of GAYl" (Ad Note) authorizes the taking of reasonable secur-
ity after the imposition of an anti-dumping duty order, pending the determination of the
final liability for the payment of the anti-dumping duty. 71 But the Appellate Body found
that the application of an "enhanced continuous bond requirement" by the U.S. on subject
imports of frozen warm water shrimp did not constitute "reasonable security" for the
payment of anti-dumping duties within the meaning of the Ad Note because the U.S. had
failed to show that anti-dumping duty rates in respect of subject shrimp were likely to
increase, resulting in significant additional unsecured liability.
72
One additional decision addressing claims under the SCM Agreement was issued in
2008. In Mexico-Olive Oil, the EC was partially successful in its challenge against Mex-
ico's imposition of definitive countervailing measures on imports of olive oil. 73 Although
the Panel rejected a number of claims advanced by the EC, it considered that Mexico had
acted inconsistently with Article 11.11 of the SCM Agreement by failing to conclude the
investigation within eighteen months from its initiation and with Article 12.4.1 of that
Agreement by failing to require non-confidential summaries of information submitted
during the course of the investigation on a confidential basis. The Panel also found that
Mexico had violated Article 15.1 of the SCM Agreement, which requires that injury deter-
minations be based on positive evidence, because Mexico's investigating authority limited
its injury analysis to the periods from April to December of 2000, 2001, and 2002. 74 The
Panel report in Mexico-Olive Oil was the only decision not to be appealed in 2008, and
the DSB adopted it on October 21, 2008.
69. See id. 9j 214, 221.
70. See Appellate Body Report, US-Measures Relating to Shrimp from Thailan and US-Customs Bond Direc-
tive for Merchandise Subiect to Anti-Dumping ICountervailing Duties, WT/DS343/AB/R, WT/DS345/AB/R
(July 16, 2008). Due to the similar subject matter, the Appellate Body issued a single report on the appeals
presented by Thailand and India, respectively. The Panel Report in US-Shrimp (Thailand), WT/DS343/R
(Feb. 29, 2008), also included a finding that zeroing in average-to-average comparisons in original investiga-
tions is not consistent with Article 2.4.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. The United States did not chal-
lenge this finding on appeal.
71. See id. 9J 243.
72. See id. J 268.
73. See Panel Report, Mexico-Definitive Countervailing Measures on Olive Oil from the European Communi-
ties, WT/DS341/R (Sept. 4, 2007).
74. See id. T 8.1.
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B. DISPUTES REGARDING IMPLEMENTATION
Disputes concerning implementation of the DSB's ruling and recommendations contin-
ued to represent a significant portion of the agenda of the DSB in 2008 with the issuance
of two Panel and two Appellate Body reports under Article 21.5 of the DSU.
1. US-Upland Cotton (Article 21.5-Brazil)
On June 2, 2008, the Appellate Body issued its report in US-Upland Cotton (Article
21.5-Brazil).75 The Appellate Body upheld the Panel's ultimate finding that the United
States failed to fully implement the DSB's recommendations and rulings in the original
proceedings.76 The Appellate Body found that export credit guarantees provided under
the United States' revised General Sales Manager (GSM) 102 programme constituted "ex-
port subsidies" within the meaning of item (j) of the Illustrative List of Export Subsidies
annexed to the SCM Agreement because the premiums charged under the programme
continued to be inadequate to cover its long-term operating costs and losses. 77 The Ap-
pellate Body also held that the effect of marketing loan and counter-cyclical payments
from the United States to upland cotton producers is significant price suppression in the
world market for this product within the meaning of Article 6.3(c) of the SCM Agree-
ment, resulting in "present" serious prejudice to the interest of Brazil under Article 5(c) of
that Agreement. 78
2. EC-Bananas (Article 21.5-Ecuador II and U.S.)
On November 26, 2008, the Appellate Body confirmed the Panel's decision that the
EC's revised import regime for bananas fell short of implementing the DSB's recommen-
dations and rulings in EC-Bananas Il. 79 The Appellate Body found that the duty-free
tariff quota reserved for African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries was inconsistent
with Articles XIII: I and 2 of GATT because non-ACP suppliers were denied access to the
tariff quota.80 The Appellate Body also upheld, albeit for different reasons, the Panel's
finding that the EC's €176/mt tariff for Most-Favored Nation (MFN) bananas, without
consideration of the tariff quota bound at an in-quota tariff of C75/mt, resulted in import
duties that exceeded the bound rates in the EC's Schedule of Concessions in violation of
Article I1:l(b) of GA'IT. 81
75. See Appellate Body Report, US Subsidies on Upland Cotton-Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Bra-
zil, WTI/DS267/AB/RW (June 2, 2008) [hereinafter US-Upland Cotton (Article 21.5-Brazil)].
76. See Appellate Body Report, US-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/AB/R (Mar. 3, 2005). The
Panel and the Appellate Body found that the United States provided domestic support, export subsidies, and
import substitution subsidies to upland cotton, as well as export credit guarantees to upland cotton and other
products, in violation of U.S. obligations under the Agreement on Agriculture and the SCM Agreement.
77. See US-Upland Cotton (Article 21.5-Brazil), supra note 75, at 322.
78. See id. 447.
79. See Appellate Body Report, EC-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas (Second
Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSUby Ecuador), WT/DS27/AB/RW2/ECU (Nov. 26, 2008) [hereinafter Second
Recourse]; EC-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas (Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by
the US), W7T/DS27/AB/RW/USA (Nov. 26, 2008).
80. See Second Recourse, supra note 79, at 345.
81. See id. 455.
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C. NAFTA PANEL REPORTS
When a NAFTA binational panel reviews an antidumping or countervailing duty deter-
mination to determine whether it is in accordance with law, such law includes "judicial
precedents to the extent a court of the importing party would rely on such materials." 82
The panel in Carbon & Alloy Steel Wire Rod from Canada, however, disregarded several
Federal Circuit precedents finding Commerce's practice of "zeroing" in antidumping
cases to be legal, and instead followed decisions of the VTO Appellate Body, which
reached the opposite conclusion. 83 The binational panel declared itself a "generic or vir-
tual United States court," which apparently meant something akin to a U.S. federal ap-
peals court for its own virtual circuit.84 The dispute was settled and the proceeding
terminated before final panel action. 85 Otherwise, the United States could have brought
an extraordinarv challenge under NAAFTA Article 1904.13, claiming that the panel "mani-
festly exceeded its powers, authority or jurisdiction" by applying the wrong body of law.
The NAFTA Article extraordinary challenge standard is exceptionally high, but an appeal
of this decision might have resulted in the first case finding that standard to be satisfied.
In other binational panel reviews, two decisions affirmed the agency determinations,8 6
and one case was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because the antidumping order had
been revoked pursuant to the U.S.-Canada Softwood Lumber Agreement.87
TV. U.S. Trade Remedy Cases
A. ADMINISTRATIVE DETERMINATIONS
The rate of initiation of antidumping and countervailing duty investigations during
2008 decreased from 2007 levels with sixteen antidumping investigations and six counter-
vailing duty investigations initiated. 8 8 Many cases initiated in 2007, however, reached
their final determinations in 2008, creating another busy year for international trade at the
agency level.
82. NALFTA Article 1904.2.
83. See North American Free Trade Agreement [NAFTA] Panel Decision, Carbon and Certain Alloy Steel
Wire Rod from Canada, 21, USA-CDA-2006-1904-04 (Nov. 28, 2007), available at http://www.worldtradelaw.
net/nafta 19/wirerod-dumping-nafta 19.pdf.
84. Id., at 21.
85. See NAFTA, Article 1904 Binational Panel Reviews: Notice of Consent Motion To Terminate Panel
Review, 73 Fed. Reg. 23,183 (Apr. 29, 2008).
86. Stainless Steel Sheet and Strip in Coils from Mexico, Case No. USA-MEX-2005-1904-06 (U.S. Int'l
Trade Comm'n Sept. 10, 2008), http://www.worldtradelaw.net/naftal9/stainlessincoils-injurysunset-naftal9.
pdf; NAFTA Panel Decision, Final Determination of the Antidumping Investigation of Carbon Steel Tube Imports
With Straight Longitudinal Seams from the United States, MEX-USA-2005-1904-1 (Mar. 13, 2008).
87. NAFTA Panel Decision, Certain Softwood Lumber Products From Canada: Final Scope Ruling Regarding
Entries Made Under HTSUS 4409.10.05, USA-CDA-2006-1904-05 (June 25, 2008).
88. See United States Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, Import Administra-
tion, Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Investigations: Jan 01, 2000 to Current, http://ia.ita.doc.gov/
stats/inv-initiations-2000-current.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2009).
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1. Department of Commerce's New Targeted Dumping Methodology
In Certain Nails from the People's Republic of China and the United Arab Emirates, the
Department of Commerce (DOC) changed its targeted dumping calculation methodol-
ogy. At the preliminary stage in both proceedings, DOC applied the targeted dumping
standards and methodologies consistent with Coated Free Sheet from Korea,s9 using the pre-
ponderance at 2 percent (P/2) test, and determined that targeted dumping was taking
place.90 DOC also stated that it was reassessing the framework and standards for its
targeted dumping analysis, intended to develop a new framework, and requested com-
ments.91 Thereafter, DOC developed a new test to determine whether targeted dumping
had occurred.
After the preliminary results, DOC issued a post-preliminary determination relating to
its targeted dumping calculation methodologies relying on the new methodology. 92 The
first prong of the new methodology, the "standard deviation test," required DOC to "de-
termine the share of the alleged target's (whether purchaser, region, or time period)
purchases of identical merchandise,9 3 by sales value, that are at prices more than one stan-
dard deviation below the average price of that identical merchandise to all customers." 94
DOC stated that if the total sales value of purchases that were more than one standard
deviation below average price "exceeds thirty-three percent of the sales value to the al-
leged target of the identical merchandise, then the pattern requirement" under 19 C.F.R.
§ 351.414(f)(1)(i) was met.
The second prong of the new methodology, the "price gap test," required DOC to
examine all sales that pass the standard deviation test and to determine the "sales value for
which the difference between the average price to the alleged target and the lowest non-
target average price exceed[ed] the average price gap (weighted by sales value) observed in
the non-targeted group." 95 If the share of these sales exceeded five percent of sales value
89. Coated Free Sheet from the Republic of Korea: Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value
72 Fed. Reg. 60,630, Issues and Decision Memorandum cmt. 3 (Oct. 25, 2007), available at http://
ia.ita.doc.gov/frn/summary/korea-south/E7-2103 5- l.pdf.
90. Certain Steel Nails from the People's Republic of China: Preliminary Determination of Sales at Less
Than Fair Value, 73 Fed. Reg. 3928, 3940 (Jan. 23, 2008); see also Certain Steel Nails from the United Arab
Emirates: Notice of Preliminary Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value, 73 Fed. Reg. 3945, 3947-
48 (Jan. 23, 2008).
91. Id.
92. Memorandum from Stephen J. Claeys, Deputy Assistant Sec'y, Import Admin., to David M. Spooner,
Assistant Sec'y, Import Admin., on Antidumping Duty Investigations of Certain Steel Nails from the Peoples
Republic of China and the United Arab Emirates (Apr. 21, 2008) (on file with Import Admin.) [hereinafter
Post-Preliminary Determinations on Targeted Dumping].
93. Commerce identifies identical products by control number. Certain Steel Nails from the United Arab
Emirates: Notice of Final Determination at Less Than Fair Value, 73 Fed. Reg. 33,985, Issues and Decision
Memorandum cmt. 4, (June 16, 2008), available at http://ia.ita.doc.gov/fin/summary/uae/E8-13490-1.pdf
[hereinafter Nails from the UAE].
94. Post-Preliminary Determinations on Targeted Dumping, supra note 92, at 7-8. The standard deviation and
the average price are calculated using a POI-wide average price weighted by sales value to the alleged target
and POI-wide average price weighted by sales value to each distinct non-targeted entity of identical
merchandise.
95. Id. at 8.
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to the alleged target of the identical merchandise, then the significant difference require-
ment was met, and DOC determines that targeted dumping had occurred. 96
DOC upheld its new methodology in the final results but applied a volume-based
method, rather than the value-based method used in the post-preliminary analysis, to both
the standard deviation test and the price gap test.97 In upholding the new methodology,
DOC stated that the new methodology was "statutorily and statistically superior to the P/
2 test for identifying targeted dumping."98 Specifically, DOC stated that the P/2 test
collapsed the pattern and significant differences requirements and relied on a "single,
bright-line price threshold of two percent to define targeted dumping that does not ac-
count for price variations specific to the market in question." 99 DOC noted that it had
initiated a separate process to gather additional comments and may further revise its
targeted dumping methodology in future investigations. 100 In fact, the DOC withdrew
the regulations on targeted dumping on December 10, 2008.101
2. Countervailing Duty Determinations
There were several significant developments in 2008 relating to the DOC's treatment
of Chinese products under the SCM Agreement.
a. The Countervailability of Subsidies Conferred Prior to China's Accession to the
WTO
In the Circular Welded Pipe from China, DOC determined it was "appropriate and ad-
ministratively desirable" to establish a uniform date from which to identify and measure
subsidies in China. 102 In its preliminary determination, DOC adopted December 11,
2001, as the date from which it would identify and measure subsidies. 103
During the final phase of the investigation, parties argued that different dates (or no
date at all) should be used as the cut-off date. Specifically, the petitioners and U.S. Steel
argued that establishing a date certain conflicts with DOC's statutory mandate to investi-
gate subsidies, conflicts with the average useful life regulations that support the full recog-
nition of countervailable subsidies, and provides special treatment to China where nothing
in the VTO's Accession Protocol states or implies such special treatment. 04 China ar-
96. Id.
97. Certain Steel Nails from the People's Republic of China: Final Determination of Sales at Less Than
Fair Value, 73 Fed. Reg. 33,977, Issues and Decision Memorandum cmt. 5 (June 16, 2008); Nails from the
UA , supra note 93, at Issues and Decision Memorandum cmt. 5.
98. Nails from the UAE, supra note 93, at Issues and Decision Memorandum cmt. 7.
99. Id. Issues and Decision Memorandum cmt. 8.
100. Id. at Issues and Decision Memorandum cmt. 4; see also Proposed Methodology for Identifying and
Analyzing Targeted Dumping in Antidumping Investigations, 73 Fed. Reg. 26,371 (proposed May 9, 2008).
101. See Withdrawal of Regulatory Provisions Governing Targeted Dumping in Antidumping Duty Investi-
gations, 73 Fed. Reg. 74930 (Dec. 10, 2008).
102. Circular Welded Carbon Quality Steel Pipe from the People's Republic of China: Final Affirmative
Countervailing Duty Determination, 73 Fed. Reg. 31,966, Issues and Decision Memorandum cmt. 2 (June 5,
2008), available at http://ia.ita.doc.gov/fin/sumnmary/prc/E8-12606-1.pdf [hereinafter Circular Welded Pipe
from China].
103. Circular Welded Carbon Quality Steel Pipe from the People's Republic of China: Preliminary Affirm-
ative Countervailing Duty Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. 63,875, 63,880 (Nov. 13, 2007).
104. Circular Welded Pipe from China, supra note 102, at Issues and Decision Memorandum cmt. 2.
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gued for a later cut-off date, such as April 9, 2007-the publication date of the Coated Free
Sheet from China preliminary results-because parties had no reasonable expectation that
the CVD law would be applied to China, and prior practice indicates that the cut-off date
should be the moment when DOC determined that a non-market economy country be-
came sufficiently market-based to apply the CVD law.105
In its final June 2 008 determination, DOC continued to find that it was appropriate and
administratively desirable to establish a uniform cut-off date of December 11, 2001, to
identify and measure subsidies. DOC stated that it "had the discretion not to apply the
CVD law where subsidies could not meaningfully be identified or measured" and that its
analysis led to the conclusion that the economic changes that occurred leading up to
WTO accession allowed DOC to identify or measure countervailable subsidies in
China. 10 6 DOC made similar conclusions in subsequent cases.'0 7
b. Provision of Inputs for Less Than Adequate Remuneration
The DOC determined that the Government of China was providing inputs for less than
adequate remuneration to certain producers of subject merchandise for the first time in
Circular Welded Pipe from China.08 This significant determination resulted in specific
findings relating to a determination of what constitutes an "authority" in China and what
benchmarks to use the subsidy calculation. These findings were affirmed in subsequent
cases and will have a significant impact on future countervailing duty proceedings involv-
ing China.
i. Whether a State-Owned Enterprise Is an "Authority"
Under U.S law, a countervailable subsidy is provided when an administrative authority
provides a financial contribution that is specific, and a benefit is thereby conferred. 1 9
The term "authority" means "a government of a country or any public entity within the
territory of the country."" 0 In the case of China, where there are many state-owned
enterprises (SOEs), a crucial question in the investigation of this subsidy became whether
an SOE was a public entity with the ability to provide a financial contribution."'
The Government of China argued that DOC had to determine individually whether
each state-owned supplier was an authority." 2 It argued that DOC should apply a five-
factor test to determine whether each supplier was a public entity and thus able to provide
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. See Laminated Woven Sacks from the People's Republic of China: Final Affirmative Countervailing
Duty Determination, 73 Fed. Reg. 35,639, Issues and Decision Memorandum cmt. 2 (June 24, 2008), availa-
ble at http://ia.ita.doc.gov/frn/summary/PRC/E8-14256-1.pdf [hereinafter Laminated Woven Sacks from
China); Certain New Pneumatic Off-the-Road Tires from the People's Republic of China: Final Affirmative
Countervailing Duty Determination, 73 Fed. Reg. 40,480, Issues and Decision Memorandum cmt. A.4 (July
15, 2008), available at http://ia.ita.doc.gov/frn/summary/PRC/E8-16154-1.pdf [hereinafter Off-the-Road
Tires from China].
108. Circular Welded Pipe from China, supra note 102, at Issues and Decisions Memorandum cmt. 7.
109. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1677(5)(A)-(B) (2000).
110. Id. at 5(B).
111. Circular Welded Pipe from China, supra note 102, at Issues and Decisions Memorandum cmt. 7.
112. Id.
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a financial contribution.1 3 Petitioners countered that China's SOEs were certainly not
private and thus constituted public entities as a result of the state's ownership interest and
that the five-factor test was relevant to the factual situation at issue.'1 4 Petitioners also
argued the treatment of SOEs was consistent with China's obligations under its WTO
accession.'15 DOC determined that a company with majority state ownership was an "au-
thority" capable of providing a financial contribution.' 6 DOC subsequently affirmed this
determination in Laminated Woven Sacks from China117 and Off-the-Road Tires from
China118 investigations relying on the CVD Preamble."19
ii. Determining the Appropriate Benchmark
After a determination that a government provided a good or service, DOC must iden-
tify an appropriate market-determined benchmark to measure the adequacy of remunera-
tion for the good or service. 120 DOC prefers to use tier one, in-country benchmarks,
"because such prices generally would be expected to reflect most closely the prevailing
market conditions of the purchaser under investigation." 121 The DOC, however, will find
that prices for such goods and services are significantly distorted if the foreign govern-
ment provides the majority, or a substantial portion. of the market and will determine
those prices to be an inappropriate basis to measure the benefit. 2 2 In Circular Welded Pipe
from China, because 96.1% of Chinese hot rolled steel production was from SOEs, DOC
determined that domestic Chinese prices for hot rolled steel were distorted. 123 DOC,
however, used another tier one benchmark: actual import prices.
DOC found that one respondent purchased hot rolled steel from a supplier outside of
China and that the import price paid was comparable to the benchmark used in prelimi-
nary determination, Steel Benchmarker prices.' 24 As a result, DOC determined that the
113. Id. (citing Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination: Dynamic Random Access Memory
Semiconductors from the Republic of Korea, 68 Fed. Reg. 37, 122, Issues and Decision Memorandum cmt. I
(June 23, 2003), available at http://ia.ita.doc.gov/fm/summary/korea-south/03-15793-1.pdf.
114. Id.
115. See World Trade Organization, Report Of The Working Party On The Accession Of China of 13
November 2001, 172, WT/MIN(01)/3 ("[W]hen state-owned enterprises (including banks) provided finan-
cial contributions, they were doing so as government actors within the scope of Article 1.1(a) of the SCM
Agreement.").
116. See Circular Welded Pipe from China, supra note 102, at Issues and Decision Memorandum cmt. 7.
117. See Laminated Woven Sacks from China, supra note 107, at Issues and Decision Memorandum cmt. 12.
118. See Off-the-Road Tires from China, supra note 107, at Issues and Decision Memorandum cmt. D.2.
119. Laminated Woven Sacks from China, supra note 107, at Issues and Decision Memorandum cmt. 12
(citing Countervailing Duties: Final Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. 65,348, 65,402 (Nov. 25, 1998)) ("This is consistent
with the Preamble, which states that 'we intend to continue our longstanding practice of treating most gov-
ernment-owned corporations as the government itself . . ").
120. The regulations provide a list of potential benchmarks in hierarchical order by preference: (1) market
prices from actual transactions within the country under investigation ("tier one"); (2) world market prices
that would be available to purchasers in the country under investigation ("tier two"); or (3) an assessment of
whether the government price is consistent with market principles ("tier three"). See 19 C.F.R.
§ 351.511(a)(2) (1999).
121. Circular Welded Pipe from China, supra note 102, at Issues and Decision Memorandum cmt. 7.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.; see also Preliminary Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination: Circular Welded Carbon
Quality Steel Pipe from the People's Republic of China, 72 Fed. Reg. 63,875, 63, 882 (Nov. 13, 2007).
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actual import price and the Steel Benchmarker prices were tier one benchmarks and relied
on both in the final determination.12S
In Off-the-Road Tires from China, DOC used tier one benchmarks because of the high
penetration of imports of both natural and synthetic rubber and lack of other evidence of
government distortion, finding that the Chinese natural and synthetic rubber markets
were not distorted.126 In Laminated Woven Sacks from China, DOC used tier two
benchmarks, world market prices that would be available to purchasers in China, as its
benchmark. Because the Government of China declined to provide the necessary infor-
mation to examine the extent of government involvement in the petrochemical industry,
the DOC applied an adverse inference to find that government ownership distorted the
prices for these inputs in China. 127
c. Provision of Land for Less Than Adequate Remuneration and Out of Country
Benchmarks
In the Laminated Woven Sacks, DOC determined, for the first time, that the Govern-
ment of China provided land to a respondent for less than adequate remuneration. 128
During the investigation, one respondent reported that it was located in an industrial
park.' 29 DOC found that, in creating the industrial park, the government at the county
level identified a specific, contiguous area of land within its jurisdiction, designated that
land as an industrial park, and controlled the granting of land-use rights within the indus-
trial park. 130 As a result, DOC found that this provision of land-use rights was de jure
specific because the land-use rights within the industrial park were limited a designated
geographical region pursuant to 19 U.S.C § 1677(5A)(D)(iv). DOC found that the provi-
sion of land-use rights was a financial contribution of a "good or service," explaining that
the CVD Preamble specifically contemplated land-use rights as "goods or services" under
19 C.F.R. § 351.51 l(a)(2)(iii). 131
In determining the appropriate benchmark, DOC found that a tier one benchmark was
not appropriate because there was no private land ownership in China resulting in the
distortion of Chinese land prices. 132 DOC also looked to tier three benchmarks but found
that due to government involvement, as well as the widespread and documented deviation
from the authorized methods of pricing and allocating land, the purchase of land-us
rights in China is not conducted in accordance with market principles. 133 As a result,
DOC was left with only the tier two (world market price) benchmark.
125. Circular Welded Pipe from China, supra note 102, at Issues and Decision Memorandum cmt. 7.
126. Off-the-Road Tires from China, supra note 107, at Issues and Decision Memorandum 11. As
benchmarks, DOC used each company's monthly weighted average import prices of natural and synthetic
rubber and purchases of privately produced domestic natural and synthetic rubber, where available.
127. Laminated Woven Sacks from China, supra note 107, at. Issues and Decision Memorandum cmt. 14.
128. Id. at Issues and Decision Memorandum cmt. 8.
129. Id. at Issues and Decision Memorandum cmt. 9.
130. Id.
131. Id. at Issues and Decision Memorandum cmt. 8.
132. Id. at Issues and Decision Memorandum cmt. 10. DOC confirmed that all urban land (industrial and
commercial land) is state-owned, and all rural land is collectively owned (agricultural land, residential land,
and land used by township enterprises).
133. Id.
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Because there is no world market price for land, DOC reviewed the choices respon-
dents made in determining where to locate their factory.134 DOC found that producers
consider a number of markets, including Thailand, as an option for production bases in
Asia beyond China. 135 Although respondents suggested Indian land prices as a bench-
mark, DOC noted that there was no evidence that India competes directly with China in
attracting producers and determined not to use the land benchmark prices from India
because there was no record evidence that land prices from India were comparable to land
values in China. Petitioners suggested Taiwan land prices as a benchmark.136 DOC
found, however, that "Taiwan is not economically similar to China." 137 As a result, DOC
found that the price information for land in Thailand was the best and most appropriate
information on the record of this investigation to use as its land benchmark.
d. The Application of DOC's Change In Ownership Methodology
In Off-the-Road Tires from China, DOC applied, for the first time since modification, its
change in ownership (CIO) methodology.138 DOC found that the company purchased by
the respondent was an SOE at the time of the CIO and that the transaction was not at
arm's length or for fair market value. 139 As a result, the transaction did not extinguish the
non-recurring subsidies provided to the SOE prior to the CIO, and the DOC attributed
the subsidies to the new company.' 40 Specifically, DOC attributed the debt forgiveness
and forgiveness of loan guarantees received by the purchased SOE to the respondent. In
addition, DOC found that the government provided the respondent with land for less
than adequate remuneration.
The respondent argued that the government relinquished its shares in previous com-
pany years prior to the CIO and that there was no government control.' 4' DOC found
that the government retained a significant level of control over the company and that
there was a rebuttable presumption that village committees were authorities. 142 Thus, the
requirement of complete relinquishment of government control was not met.143
DOC also found that the transaction was not at arm's length because the chairman of
the prior company represented both the buyer and seller in the auction of equipment, and
the employee-owners had interests in the successful completion of the transaction. 144
DOC found that what was significant was "whether the buyer and seller each acted in its
own interests and the interests of the buyer and seller were independent of each other." 45




138. See Off-the-Road Tires from China, supra note 107, at Issues and Decision Memorandum 18-21; see also
Notice of Final Modification of Agency Practice Under Section 123 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act,
68 Fed. Reg. 37,125 (June 23, 2003).
139. See Off-the-Road Tires from China, supra note 107, at Issues and Decision Memorandum 18-21.
140. Id.
141. See Off-the-Road Tires from China, supra note 107, at Issues and Decision Memorandum cnt. F.3.
142. Id.
143. See Notice of Final Modification 68 Fed. Reg. at 37,127.
144. See Off-the-Road Tires from China, supra note 107, at Issues and Decision Memorandum cmt. F.4.
145. Id.; see also Notice of Final Modification 68 Fed. Reg. at 37,127, 37,130.
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DOC found, inter alia, that the employees had an interest in the purchasing company at
the time they were required to approve the transaction as owners.
146
Finally, DOC reviewed the factors provided in the Modification Notice and determined
that the parties did not affirmatively demonstrate that the sale was at arm's length for fair
market value. 147 DOC highlighted that the test for fair-market value was "whether the
government, in its capacity as the seller, acted in a manner consistent with the normal
sales practices of private, commercial sellers in that country."148 Here, DOC found that
the parties did "not show that private, commercial sellers in China routinely ignore stan-
dard considerations in a sale of this magnitude."' 149
B. AGENCY POLICY INITIATIVES: WITHDRAWAL OF CERTAINh REGULATORY
PROVISIONS
1. Withdrawal of Regulations Covering Tolling
On March 28, 2008, DOC withdrew the regulation covering the treatment of tollers or
subcontractors, 19 C.F.R. § 351.401(h). °50 DOC intended this regulation, promulgated
in 1997,151 to ensure that DOC's analysis in calculating a dumping margin focused on the
party setting the price of subject merchandise when it subcontracted the manufacture of
such merchandise to another company. The U.S. Court of International Trade (CIT),
however, recently interpreted the regulation as having the unintended effect of bestowing
the status of "foreign manufacturer" or "producer" upon parties in the United States that
otherwise would have assumed the status of purchasers of subject merchandise. 152
DOC stated that the CIT's interpretation could restrict the exercise of DOC's discre-
tion and result in DOC identifying the wrong entity as the seller of subject merchandise.
Moreover, DOC determined that the CIT's interpretation confounds the Department's
ability to determine instances of dumping by examining the price at which the merchan-
dise is first sold in the United States. 5 3
DOC also determined that the proper application of the law would be thwarted if a
party that "customarily assumes the status of a 'purchaser' is bestowed with the status of
'foreign manufacturer' or producer."' 54 If such an event occurred, DOC would have no
basis upon which to make antidumping duty determinations because the actual consumer
would be considered the "foreign producer" without making any sales of subject merchan-
dise. As a result, DOC found that it could not calculate a dumping margin because there
would be no sales to compare, or its margin calculation could be distorted or miscalculated
because the incorrect U.S. sales were identified as the relevant sales under the regula-
146. See Off-the-Road Tires from China, supra note 107, at Issues and Decision Memorandum cmt. F.4.
147. See Notice of Final Modification, 68 Fed. Reg. at 37,127.
148. See Off-the-Road Tires from China, supra note 107, at Issues and Decision Memorandum cmt. F.5.
149. Id.
150. See Withdrawal of Regulations Governing the Treatment of Subcontractors, 73 Fed. Reg. 16,517 (Mar.
28, 2008).
151. Antidumping Duties; Countervailing Duties, 19 C.F.R. 351, 353, and 355 (May 19, 1997).
152. See USEC Inc. v. United States, 281 F. Supp. 2d 1,334 (Ct. Int'l Tr. 2003), affd on other grounds sub
nom, Eurodifv. United States, 411 F.3d 1355, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
153. See Withdrawal of Regulations, 73 Fed. Reg. at 16,517.
154. Id.
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tion.155 In addition, purchasers bestowed with the status of "foreign manufacturer" or
producer would incorrectly obtain the right to appeal DOC's antidumping determinations
as interested parties.1 56
DOC found these effects inconsistent with its intentions and statutory mandate to pro-
vide relief to domestic industries suffering material injury from unfairly traded imports.
DOC determined that immediate revocation was necessary to ensure the proper and effi-
cient operation of the antidumping law and to provide the relief intended by Congress.
DOC stated that it was "not replacing this regulation with a new regulation," but "is
returning to a case-by-case adjudication, until additional experience allows the Depart-
ment to gain greater understanding of the problem." 157
2. Withdrawal of Regulations Covering Targeted Dumping
On December 10, 2008, DOC withdrew the regulatory provisions governing targeted
dumping, 19 C.F.R. § 351.414(0, (g), and 351.301(d)(5).15 8 DOC explained that, at the
time it promulgated these regulations on May 19, 1997, it had never performed a targeted
dumping analysis and had no departmental experience on the issue.1 59 Thus, DOC deter-
mined that it "may have established thresholds or other criteria that have prevented the
use of this comparison methodology to unmask dumping, contrary to the Congressional
intent" and found that the immediate revocation of the provisions would facilitate the
proper and efficient operation of the antidumping law.
160
The Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, directs DOC normally to calculate dumping mar-
gins for comparable merchandise by one of two methods: (1) by comparing weighted-
average normal values to weighted-average export prices (i.e., the average-to-average
method); or (2) by comparing the normal values of individual transactions to the export
price of individual transactions (i.e., the transaction-to-transaction method). 16 1 There is
an exception which may be used to prevent the masking of certain types of dumping, i.e.,
targeted dumping. When DOC finds that there is a pattern of export prices for compara-
ble merchandise that differ significantly among purchasers, regions, or periods of time,
and where such differences cannot be taken into account using one of the two preferred
methods, DOC can invoke the exception and compare the weighted average of the normal
values to the export price of individual transactions (i.e., average-to-transaction
methodology) 162
Because DOC did not have the benefit of any departmental experience on the issue of
targeted dumping at the time of promulgation, the regulatory provisions add additional
criteria beyond the scope original sections in the Tariff Act. Specifically, 19 C.F.R.
§ 35 1.414(0 and (g) established certain criteria for analyzing targeted dumping allegations
and were intended to clarify when the average-to-transaction methodology would be
155. See id.
156. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(9) (2000).
157. See Withdrawal of Regulations, 73 Fed. Reg. at 16,518.
158. Withdrawal of Regulations Governing Targeted Dumping, 73 Fed. Reg. 74930.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677 f-l(d)(l)(A).
162. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677 f-l(d)(l)(B).
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used. 163 DOC explained that these provisions may have prevented the use of the average-
to-transaction methodology to unmask dumping. Moreover, 19 C.F.R. § 351.301(d)(5),
which established the deadline for submitting allegations, may have established an imprac-
tical deadline. Thus, these sections would act to deny relief to domestic industries suffer-
ing material injury from unfairly traded imports, an effect contrary to DOC's intention in
promulgating the provisions and inconsistent with its statutory mandate to provide relief
to domestic industries materially injured by unfairly traded imports. As a result, DOC
determined that immediate revocation necessary to ensure the proper and efficient opera-
tion of the antidumping law and to provide the relief intended by Congress.
C. COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL
CIRCUIT CASES
There were few important precedential trade cases in 2008. Although there were a
healthy number of cases at both the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC or
Federal Circuit) and the CIT, most of them were of interest to the parties only, as they
generally represented the application of long-standing trade-law doctrines. A few cases,
however, will have some long-standing impact, as briefly summarized below.
1. Fraud-in-the-Proceeding Cases
A recent recurring issue has been the authority of DOC and the International Trade
Commission (ITC or Commission) to take steps to deal with previous investigations that
turn out to have been tainted by fraud. Both the CAFC and the CIT dealt with this issue
in 2008.
In Tokyo Kikai Seisakusho, Ltd. v. United States,164 the Federal Circuit faced a situation
where DOC used its changed circumstances review provisions as a means of reconsidering
previously completed administrative reviews. The issue arose because DOC had con-
cluded that its previous partial revocation of an antidumping duty order with regard to
Tokyo Kikai was tainted because the company had provided false information during pre-
vious reviews. 165
The Federal Circuit upheld DOC's novel use of the changed circumstances review pro-
cedures. The court acknowledged that the changed circumstances review statute only
provided three situations where such reviews could occur and that the list did not include
rectifying fraud. The court, however, concluded that the "power to reconsider is inherent
in the power to decide," especially when the agency has exercised its power "to protect the
integrity of its own proceedings from fraud."166 The court concluded that, absent a statu-
tory bar to such a review, DOC could take actions such as reinstating a partially revoked
order, even if not explicitly authorized to do so, to rectify fraudulent activity.
163. Withdrawal of Regulations Governing Targeted Dumping 73 Fed. Reg. 74931.
164. Tokyo Kikai Seisakusho, Ltd. v. United States, 529 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
165. See Large Newspaper Printing Presses and Components Thereof, Whether Assembled or Unassem-
bled, From Japan: Final Results of Changed Circumstances Review, 71 Fed. Reg. 11,590, 11,591 (Mar. 8,
2006).
166. Seisakusho, 529 F.3d at 1360-62.
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A few months later, the CIT reached a similar result, underscoring the flexibility that
the agencies are granted in this area. In Elkem Metals Co. v. United States, 167 the CIT
issued what should be its last determination regarding the ITC's treatment of the U.S.
ferrosilicon industry, which had been engaged in a price-fixing conspiracy that had ille-
gally raised prices during part of the period of investigation considered by the ITC in its
original injury determination. In previous rulings in the same case, the CIT had held that
the ITC had the authority to reconsider rulings that were tainted by the illegal actions of
petitioners. The only issue in this case was whether the ITC's determination on remand
that any observed underselling was due to artificially high U.S. prices the illegal conspir-
acy raised was supported by substantial evidence. The Court found that the Commission
had articulated a reasonable rationale for excluding any price comparisons during the pe-
riod when the conspiracy to raise prices was occurring, and that it was reasonable for the
Commission to conclude that "underselling was not pervasive over the entire [period of
investigation]" as a result. 168 Although it took four remand determinations, the end result
was a ratification of an ITC decision to take steps to remedy a record tainted by an illegal
conspiracy, thereby obscuring the true state of the U.S. industry.
2. Appeals of ITC Cases
CIT again revisited the frequent topic of how to apply the causation standard in NSK
Corporation v. United States.169 The case involved the second sunset review of the ball
bearings orders, which the ITC had concluded should not be revoked because doing so
would lead to the continuation or recurrence of material injury.170 The respondents ar-
gued that the Commission should have extended the Federal Circuit's holding in Bratsk
Aluminum Smelter v. United States that in cases involving commodity products the Com-
mission had to "explain why the elimination of subject imports would benefit the domestic
industry," rather than non-subject imports, 171 to sunset reviews. The CIT agreed that
this was a reasonable formulation of the statute, which contains an "implied element of
causation,"'172 thereby making application of the basic Bratsk principle proper in a sunset
review.173
In the end, the CIT returned the case to the ITC, due to a blatant inconsistency in the
Commission's treatment of the continuing role of subject imports in the U.S. market. In
previous cases, the Commission had stated that an increase in subject imports following
the order indicates that material injury is unlikely to occur if the order were revoked
because the imports were able to compete even without dumping. In the case before the
Court, however, the Commission reached the opposite conclusion, finding that the
"ongoing and significant presence of subject imports in the U.S. market demonstrates the
continued importance of the U.S. market to subject producers and further shows that
167. Elkem Metals Co. v. United States, No. 99-00627, 2008 WL 4097463 (Ct. Int'l Tr. Sept. 5, 2008).
168. Id. at 22-24 & 29.
169. NSK Corp. v. United States, 577 F. Supp. 2d 1322 (Ct. Int'l Tr. 2008).
170. See Certain Bearings From China, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Singapore, and the United Kingdom,
71 Fed. Reg. 51,850 (Aug. 31, 2006).
171. NSK Corp. 593 F. Supp 2d at 1330-31 (quotig Bratsk Aluminum Smelter v. United States, 444 F.3d
1369, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2006)).
172. Id. at 1332.
173. Id.
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subject imports already have distributors or customers in place for their products."1 74
Stating that it had to "question the disparate treatment of similar findings from one sunset
review to another," the Court sent the case back to the Commission for reconsideration,
taking into account the need to apply the Bratsk analysis as well as providing a more
comprehensive discussion of supply conditions. 175
Just two weeks later, the Federal Circuit issued another case interpreting the Bratsk
requirement-this time in an investigation. In Mittal Steel Point Lisas Ltd. v. United States,
the Federal Circuit held that the Bratsk case did not require that the Commission engage
in a future-looking inquiry regarding whether an order on a commodity product would
"lead to the elimination of those goods from the market in the future or whether those
goods would be replaced by goods from other sources."'176 The CAFC, instead, clarified
that Bratsk requires the Commission to determine whether, during the period of investi-
gation, injury was fairly traceable to the presence of unfairly traded subject imports, or
whether their absence would merely have meant that non-subject imports would have
taken their place. Thus, the CAFC clarified that the "focus of the inquiry is on the cause
of injury in the past, not the prospect of effectiveness in the future." 177
In other cases of interest, the CIT held that:
" The Commission had not erred by issuing a negative final determination in the
second sunset review of cut-to-length steel plate, thereby revoking the orders on
plate from Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Japan,
Korea, Mexico, Poland, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Taiwan, and the United
Kingdom;178
" The statute allowed for the possibility that different Commissioners might rely
upon separate rationales in reaching a determination, and the Commission did not
err by retaining the order on Romanian small-diameter carbon and alloy seamless
standard, line, and pressure pipe even though some of the Commissioners evaluated
Romanian pipe on a cumulated basis and others evaluated it individually;1 79
* The Commission's finding that there was unlikely to be significant shifting of im-
ports to the United States was reached using a reasonable methodology that showed
that U.S. prices were in line with global prices, and the determination to revoke the
orders on silicon metal from Brazil and China would not lead to a continuation or
recurrence of material injury was supported by substantial evidence; 80
* The Commission had failed to provide sufficient evidence to support its finding that
the U.S. saw blade market was divided into different segments that resulted in atten-
uated competition with imported diamond saw blades, and the ITC had to recon-
sider its finding that subject imports were not a cause of material injury to the U.S.
industry;181 and
174. Id. at 1334.
175. Id.
176. Mittal Steel Point Lisas Ltd. v. United States, 53 F.3d 867, 876 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
177. Id. at 16.
178. Nucor Corp. v. United States, 569 F. Supp. 2d 1328 (Ct. Int'l Tr. 2008).
179. Mittal Steel Roman v. United States, No. 06-00173, 2008 WL 111025 (Ct. Int'l Tr. Jan. 11, 2008).
180. Globe Metallurgical Inc. v. United States, 547 F. Supp. 2d 1371 (Ct. Int'l Tr. 2008).
181. Diamond Sawblades Mfrs. Coal. v. United States, No. 06-00247, 2008 WL 576988 (Ct. Int'l Tr. Feb. 6,
2008).
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The Commission properly used its normal methodology of evaluating negligibility
using a quantity-based measure, since the products at issue were relatively uniform,
and the Commission had not erred by finding that certain lined paper school sup-
plies from China, India, and Indonesia were causing material injury.I8 2
3. Appeals of DOC Determinations
With many recent antidumping cases involving products from China, the special rules
involving how margins should be calculated for non-market economies have been the sub-
ject of much litigation in recent years. In some cases, these rules spill over into seemingly
unrelated cases, as occurred in Husteel Co. v. United States, where Korean producers of oil
country tubular goods protested DOC's decision to leave out of their margin calculation
any sales that were made while knowing that the final destination would be in China.
DOC had taken this approach on the grounds that these sales would not be representativc
because a sale ultimately intended for a Chinese company would be tainted since it was
not negotiated "on the basis of market principles."18 3
The CIT had a number of problems with this approach. Its chief issue was that DOC's
presumption that any sales to Chinese companies are unrepresentative was inconsistent
with DOC's practice in cases directly involving non-market economy producers, where
DOC "regularly calculates normal value using price data from sales between market-econ-
omy sellers and nonmarket-economy buyers."184 The Court also found it troubling that
DOC was applying its presumption in the case at hand, in that the sales at issue were in
fact "between two independent entities both operating in a market economy," with the
ultimate sale to a Chinese company only to occur later.185 Finally, the Court noted that
DOC had not even considered the possibility that the sales could have occurred based
upon global prices and thus presumptively were not even distorted at all. 1s6 The CIT
accordingly remanded the case for reconsideration by DOC.
Also of interest was the CIT's determination in Canadian Wheat Board v. United
States,'87 which involved the question of whether DOC is required to order the refund of
all duties collected after it has revoked an order. Much of the argumentation of the case
was devoted to the issue of whether the Court had jurisdiction to hear the action. Once it
had settled the question of jurisdiction, the Court had little difficulty finding that its ear-
lier decision in Tembec, Inc. v. United States'88 compelled it to find that where the ITC
issues a negative injury determination, DOC is required to refund all duties where liquida-
tion is still suspended.1s 9
In other significant opinions, the CIT held that:
The standard for determining whether a product is "later-developed merchandise"
and hence can be included within the scope of an antidumping or countervailing
182. Navneet Publications (India) Ltd. v. United States, No. 06-00401, 2008 WL 743836 (Ct. Int'l Tr. Feb.
26, 2008).
183. Husteel Co. v. United States, 558 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1359(Ct. Int'l Tr. 2008).
184. Id. at 1361.
185. Id. at 1358.
186. Id. at 1360-61.
187. Canadian Wheat Bd. v. United States, 580 F. Supp. 2d 1350 (Ct. Intl Tr. 2008).
188. Tembec, Inc. v. United States, 441 F. Supp. 2d 1302, (Ct. Int Tr. 2006).
189. See Canadian Wheat Bd., 580 F. Supp. 2d 1350.
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duty order, even if not explicitly included in the original investigation, depends on
whether the merchandise was "commercially available;"' 90
DOC is entitled to corroborate a margin calculated on the basis of "adverse facts
available" with the highest margins calculated in an earlier review. Although the
Court found it "troubling" that the margin so corroborated was nine times higher
than the overall margin from the earlier review, it reluctantly concluded that it had
to allow the approach due to a binding precedent from the Federal Circuit;19' and
DOC is justified in changing its methodology from a prior administrative review.
Aany claim that the respondent had detrimentally relied upon the old methodology
was meaningless where the change was necessitated by the failure of the respon-
dent's affiliated supplier to provide requested information. 92
4. Assessment/Duty Rulings
The long-simmering issue of whether the Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act
(commonly referred to as the Byrd Amendment) can be applied to NAFTA signatories
finally received an answer from the Federal Circuit. The Byrd Amendment provided that
final antidumping and countervailing duties were to be distributed to U.S. producers of
the like product that supported the prosecution of the actions leading to the orders. Al-
though the Byrd Amendment has been repealed, it has caused the distribution of billions
of dollars of collected duties to U.S. industries, and hundreds of millions of dollars in
previously collected duties still remain to be distributed.
When Congress passed the NAFTA, it included a provision (Section 408) that stated
that any amendment to Title VII of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988
"shall apply to goods from a NAFTA country only to the extent specified in the amend-
ment."1 93 Because the Byrd Amendment contained no mention that it applied to NAFTA
countries, certain Canadian interests, including the Canadian Wheat Board (among
others), brought suit to bar distributions of duties imposed on their products.194
The Federal Circuit ruled in their favor in Canadian Lumber Trade Alliance v. United
States. The key issue in that case was whether the Canadian interests had standing. The
Federal Circuit found that since the distribution of duties to the North Dakota Wheat
Commission, which engaged in promotional activities designed to take market share from
Canadian wheat producers, caused a "competitive" injury, there was standing for the Ca-
nadian Wheat Board to sue. 195 The Federal Circuit further found prudential standing, in
that the Canadian Wheat Board was within the "zone of interests" protected by Section
408.196 Once the CAFC found that there was standing, it easily determined that the Byrd
Amendment's failure to mention any of the NAFTA countries meant that it could not
necessarily apply to products from those countries. 197
190. See Target Corp. v. United States, 578 F. Supp. 2d 1369 (Ct. Int'l. Tr. 2008).
191. See Pam, S.P.A. v. United States, 577 F. Supp. 2d 1318 (Ct. Int'l Tr. 2008).
192. See Huvis Corp. v. United States, No. 06-00380, 2008 WL 2977890 (Ct. Int'l Tr. Aug. 5, 2008).
193. 19 U.S.C. § 3438 (2000).
194. Canadian Lumber Trade Alliance v. United States, 517 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
195. See id. at 1333.
196. See id. at 1334-35
197. See id. at 1340-42.
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The CAFC also announced an important exception to the normal rule that the assess-
ment of duties is set once Customs has liquidated an entry. This rule is nearly always
followed because it allows for finality in the assessment of duties. The Federal Circuit
held in Shinyei Corp. of America v. United States that the need for finality is superseded in
the limited circumstance where liquidation occurred at the wrong rate due to Customs or
DOC error. 198
5. Procedural Rulings
This year saw the usual grab bag of procedural and jurisdictional rulings bearing on the
authority of the trade courts to hear cases and provide meaningful relief. Trade practi-
tioners, ever fearful of missteps that can inadvertently doom an appeal, will be parsing
these cases carefully to avoid needless mistakes.
One key issue addressed by the Federal Circuit was the circumstance under which a
party can seek a review when all entries at issue have been liquidated. For several decades,
this basic issue had seemed to have a ready answer: if all entries covered by an appeal have
been liquidated, then the CIT lacks jurisdiction to entertain a direct appeal of the agency's
determination since it would not be possible to effectuate the Court's judgment on any of
the entries at issue.
In Gerdau Ameristeel Corp. v. United States, the Federal Circuit provided clarification of
an important exception to this rule. Gerdau brought action seeking judicial review of
DOC's finding of a de minimis dumping margin for the Sixth Review, even though all
affected entries had been liquidated (due to Gerdau's failure to seek an injunction prevent-
ing liquidation). Gerdau claimed that the case was not moot because it "would have the
tangible consequence of averting revocation of the Antidumping Order after the Seventh
Review" (which could occur if DOC issued a third consecutive de minimis margin in the
Seventh Review after previously doing so in the Fifth and the Sixth). 199
The CAFC agreed with Gerdau. The Court distinguished the prior rulings by noting
that hearing the action at hand "can have a significant effect on a legal interest distinct
from the particular imports subject to the Sixth Review." 200 Thus, because the CIT "can
provide meaningful relief," the Federal Circuit ruled that the CIT had erred by dismissing
the case as moot.20
1
The CIT also issued some other important jurisdictional and procedural rulings, in-
cluding determinations that:
* An intervenor can join an action, even if it expands the number of entries affected by
the case, so long as the addition of a new party does not add any new legal issues for
the court to decide;202
" A party needs to file a separate summons and complaint for investigations and sunset
reviews from each covered country, even though the ITC may have treated the in-
vestigations together and issued a combined exposition of its written views; 20 3 and
198. Shinyei Corp. of Am. v. United States, 524 F.3d 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
199. Gerdau Ameristeel Corp. v. United States, 519 F.3d 1336, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
200. Id. at 1341.
201. Id. at 1342.
202. NSK Corp. v. United States, 547 F. Supp. 2d 1312 (Ct. Int'l Tr. 2008).
203. Id.
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* The CIT will not hear an interlocutory review of DOC's procedural decisions dur-
ing the course of a review because they are not the result of final agency action.204
D. UN1TED STATES SUPREME COURT
The biggest news in 2008 trade appeals was a case that has not yet been finally decided.
In United States v. Eurodif, S.A., the U.S. Supreme Court, for the first time in the entire
history of the trade law, entertained briefs and oral argument regarding an antidumping
duty appeal. 205 The issue before the Supreme Court is whether the DOC correctly ruled
that it could apply the antidumping duty law, which applies only to "sales" of "merchan-
dise," to sales transactions where energy supply companies (utilities) provide feed uranium
and only pay in cash for the service of enrichment. Much of the oral argument centered
on the issue of whether the DOC treated services transactions inconsistently and whether
the treatment of feed uranium as fungible by both the enrichers and the utilities meant
that the return of different uranium than what was originally provided turned the delivery
of the final product into a transfer of ownership over feed uranium to enrichers, lending
credence to the argument that enrichers engaged in the sale of goods. Oral argument
took place on November 4, 2008, and a decision is expected in 2009.
V. Legislative Activity
Developing countries were the big winners in this year's small flurry of legislative activ-
ity. Trade preference programs benefiting over 130 developing countries were extended
and modified just as they were about to expire. But the movement on trade preference
programs stands in stark contrast to the lack of progress on three pending FTAs and other
trade-related legislation. A forty-eight hour showdown between President Bush and Con-
gress over the Colombia free trade agreement took a surprising and unprecedented turn,
leaving the fate of the agreement in limbo. The Panama and Korea agreements never
made it to Congress, and various trade enforcement initiatives got mired in committee.
The new Administration and the new Congress will have its work cut out for it in 2009.
A. FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS
Three FTAs signed before the June 30, 2007, expiry of TPA were pending at the outset
of 2008.206 Those same three agreements remain pending at the end of 2008. As dis-
204. Tianjin Magnesium Int'l Co. Ltd. v. United States, 533 F. Supp. 2d 1327 (Ct. Int'l Tr. 2008).
205. See Eurodif S.A. v. United States, 506 F.3d 1051 (Fed. Cir. 2007). In preceding phases of this pro-
tracted litigation, the Federal Circuit struck down DOC's imposition of antidumping duties on low enriched
uranium from France, finding that contracts for the enrichment of uranium were contracts for services, rather
than for the sale of goods, and therefore not subject to the antidumping statute. See Eurodif S.A. v. United
States, 411 F.3d 1355, 1364 (Fed. Cit. 2005); Eurodif S.A, v. United States, 423 F.3d 1275, 1278 (Fed. Cir.
2005). Both the U.S. Government and the petitioner in the original antidumping case, United States Enrich-
ment Corporation (USEC), appealed to the Supreme Court.
206. The United States-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement was signed on November 22, 2006, and
subsequently amended on June 28, 2007; The United States-Panama Trade Promotion Agreement was signed
on June 28, 2007; and the United States-Korea Free Trade Agreement was signed on June 30, 2007. See
generally Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Bilateral Trade Agreements, http://www.ustr.gov/
Trade.Agreements/Bilateral/SecionIndex.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2009).
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cussed below, the only notable activity with regard to these agreements was President
Bush's attempt to force a Congressional vote on the Colombia Free Trade Agreement,
which ultimately failed when the House of Representatives changed the "fast track" rules.
Trade promotion, or fast track, authority allows for expedited consideration of trade
agreements. 207 Once an implementing bill is formally introduced, Congress has ninety
legislative days to act. The fast track rules do not permit amendments in Committee or
floor action, and they require a straight "up or down" vote. While the "fast track" proce-
dures for Congressional actions during the ninety-day period are set forth in the statute,
these procedures are actually House and Senate rules and as such, can be modified at their
discretion.208
On April 8, 2008, without prior Congressional acquiescence, President Bush formally
submitted to Congress the United States-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement, along
with the implementing legislation and a statement of administrative action. 20 9 Congres-
sional leaders reacted negatively to President Bush's disregard of the unwritten, but estab-
lished ,protocol that the President not trigger the ninety-day clock until the
Congressional leadership indicates it is ready to receive the agreement.2 i Two days later,
the House of Representatives voted to "not apply" the procedural requirements that the
House act on the implementing legislation,211 and thereby essentially put the Colombia
free trade agreement on hold.
B. TRADE PREFERENCE PROGRAMS
The United States maintains various trade preference programs that benefit developing
countries around the world. As discussed below, Congress extended multiple programs
that were set to expire in 2008.
Under the Andean Trade Preferences Act (ATPA), the United States extends special
duty treatment to imports from Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru that meet domestic
content and other requirements.2 12 Set to expire on December 31, 2008,213 the trade
207. TPA, which allowed for expedited consideration of trade agreements, expired June 30. 2007. See Bipar-
tisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-210, § 2103(c)(1)(B), 116 Stat. 1006 (codified
as amended at 19 U.S.C.A. § 3803).
208. See Trade Act of 1974, § 151, Pub. L. No. 93-618 (codified as amended 19 U.S.C. § 2191). See also
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, TRtaDE AGREEMENTS: PROCEDURE
FOR CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL AND IMPLEMENTATION 2 (updated Mar. 16, 2005), available at http://as-
sets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL32011-20050316.pdf ("Although this statute is permanent law, it has been enacted
as an exercise of the rulemaking power of either House and can be changed by either House, with respect to
its own procedure, at any time, in the same manner and to the same extent as any other rule of that House.").
209. See Press Release, White House, President Bush Signs Letter to Send the United States-Colombia Free
Trade Agreement Implementing Legislation to Congress (Apr. 7, 2008), available at http://merin.ndu.edu/
archivepdf/colombia/WH/2008O4O7-5.pdf.
210. See Press Release, Speaker of the U.S. House of Rep., Pelosi and Rangel Statement on Administration
Sending Colombia Free Trade Agreement to Congress (Apr. 7, 2008), available at http://speaker.house.gov/
newsroom/pressreleases?id=0596.
211. H.R. Res. 1092, 110th Cong. (2008) (enacted).
212. The Andean Trade Preferences Act went into effect on December 4, 1991. Pub. L. No. 102-182, 105
Stat. 1236. Later, it was renewed and modified under the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication
Act on August 6, 2002. Pub. L. No. 107-210, 116 Stat. 1023 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 3201-
3202).
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preferences were extended for Peru and Colombia until December 31, 2009.214 Shorter
extensions were set for Ecuador215 and Bolivia 2t 6 because of Congressional concerns on
issues such as counternarcotics cooperation and treatment of U.S. investors.217 President
Bush apparently had similar concerns, suspending Bolivia's participation in the ATPA as of
December 15, 2008, after determining that the Bolivian government failed to meet coun-
ternarcotics cooperation criteria.2 8
The Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) program also was extended. Under the
GSP program, the United States provides preferential duty-free entry for more than 4,600
products from over 130 designated beneficiary countries and territories in the developing
world. 219 Set to expire on December 31, 2008, the GSP program was reauthorized and
extended until December 31, 2009.220
Other programs, such as the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) and
CAFTA-DR Act, were modified to enhance access to the U.S. market for certain textiles
and apparel products. Under AGOA, the United States extends preferential trade benefits
to sub-Saharan African countries pursuing political and economic reform.22' The changes
to AGOA include a repeal of the "abundant supply" provision to ensure that least-devel-
oped AGOA countries can use third country fabric in apparel qualifying for duty-free
treatment and a reinstatement of Mauritius' eligibility to use third country fabric in
AGOA-qualifying exports. 222 Amendments to the CAFTA-DR Act2 23 permit certain ap-
213. Legislation was enacted in February 2008 to extend the trade preferences from June 30, 2008, until
December 31, 2009. Pub. L. No. 110-91, 122 Stat. 646 (2008).
214. See Andean Trade Preference Act Extension, Pub. L. No. 110-436, § 1, 122 Stat. 4976 (2008). The free
trade agreements with Peru and Colombia, if and when implemented, would replace the preference program
for those countries. President Bush signed the United States-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement Implemen-
tation Act into law on December 14, 2007. Pub. L. No. 110-138, 121 Stat. 1455 (2007). The Peru Agree-
ment will go into effect when the President determines that Peru has taken measures necessary to comply
with its obligations under the Agreement. As discussed above, House consideration of the Colombia Agree-
ment was suspended.
215. Trade preferences for Ecuador were extended until June 30, 2009, and will be extended automatically
until December 31, 2009, unless the President determines that Ecuador does not satisfy ATPA criteria. Pub.
L. No. 110-436, § 1, 122 Stat. 4976 (2008).
216. Trade preferences for Bolivia were extended until June 30, 2009, at which point the preferences will
expire unless the President determines that Bolivia satisfies ATPA requirements. Pub. L. No, 110-436, § 1,
122 Stat. 4976 (2008).
217. See Press Release, Office of Senator Grassley, Grassley Wins Victory on Andean Trade Preferences Bill,
Which Passes Senate, Heads to House (Oct. 2, 2008), available at http://grassley.senate.gov/news/
Article.cfm?customel-dataPageID_1 502= 17559#.
218. See Proclamation No. 8323, 73 Fed. Reg. 72,677 (Nov. 28, 2008); Andean Trade Preference Act
(ATPA), as Amended: Notice Regarding Eligibility of Bolivia, 73 Fed. Reg. 57,158 (Oct. 1, 2008).
219. The Generalized System of Preferences program was instituted on January 1, 1976, and authorized
under the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. §§ 2461-67) for a ten-year period. It has been renewed periodically
since then.
220. See Andean Trade Preference Act Extension, Pub. L. No. 110-436, § 4, 122 Stat. 4976 (2008).
221. The African Growth and Opportunity Act was enacted as Title I of the Trade and Development Act of
2000. Pub. L. No. 106-200, 114 Stat. 251 (2000). It has been amended and extended since then. See, e.g.,
Trade Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-210, 116 Stat. 933 (2002); and AGOA Acceleration Act of 2004, Pub. L.
No. 108-274, 118 Stat. 820 (2004).
222. See Andean Trade Preference Act Extension, Pub. L. No. 110-436, § 3, 122 Stat. 4976 (2008).
223. President Bush signed the Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement
Implementation Act (the "CAFTA-DR Act") into law on August 2, 2005. Pub. L. No. 109-53, 119 Stat. 462
(2005).
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parel products from the Dominican Republic, which use U.S. fabric and limited amount of
third country fabric, to enter the U.S. market duty-free.224
The Haitian Hemispheric Opportunity through Partnership Encouragement (HOPE)
Act2 25 also was modified to simplify the rules for allowing Haitian apparel to qualify for
duty-free access to the U.S. market.22 6 Additionally, under the HOPE Act, a new labor
monitoring mechanism was added and preferential treatment for apparel imports was ex-
tended until September 30, 2018.227 Preferential access for certain textile and apparel
products under the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI)228 also was extended until September
30, 2010.229
C. LooK AHEAD TO 2009
Over the course of the coming year, the new 111 th Congress will likely tackle a series of
contentious trade-related legislative initiatives left unaddressed by the previous Congress.
Those initiatives include consideration of whether undervaluation of foreign currency vis-
a-vis the U.S. dollar is actionable under the antidumping or countervailing duty laws;
trade adjustment assistance; trade enforcement legislation, including proposals to codify
the DOC's authority to apply the countervailing duty law to nonmarket economy coun-
tries; limiting presidential discretion in Section 421 China safeguard measures; and estab-
lishing the position of chief trade enforcement officer in the Office of the U.S. Trade
Representative. In short, 2009 looks to be a busy year for the new Administration and the
new Congress.
224. See Andean Trade Preference Act Extension, Pub. L. No. 110-436, § 2, 122 Stat. 4976 (2008).
225. The Haitian Hemispheric Opportunity through Partnership Encouragement (HOPE) Act provides
duty-free access to the U.S. market for certain apparel articles if they meet strict guidelines and rules of
origin. Pub. L. No. 109-432, §§ 5001-06, 120 Stat. 3181(2006).
226. See Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 (Farm Bill), Pub. L. No. 110-246, § 15402, 122 Stat.
1651 (2008).
227. Farm Bill, Pub. L. No. 110-246, § 15403, 122 Stat.1651 (2008).
228. The Caribbean Basin Recovery Act (CBERA), commonly referred to as the Caribbean Basin Initiative
or CBI, was enacted on August 5, 1983. Pub. L. No. 98-67, 97 Stat. 369 (1983) (codified at 19 U.S.C. 2701-
07). Under CBI, the United States extends duty-free treatment to a variety of products from over twenty
Caribbean Basin countries and territories. The CBI has been modified a number of times since 1983.
229. Farm Bill, Pub. L. No. 110-246, § 15408, 122 Stat. 1651 (2008).
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